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Abstract: Performing dependability evaluation 
along with other analyses at architectural level 
allows both making architectural tradeoffs and 
predicting the effects of architectural decisions on 
the dependability of an application. This paper 
gives guidelines for building architectural 
dependability models for software systems using 
the AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language). It presents reusable modeling 
patterns for fault-tolerant applications and shows 
how the presented patterns can be used in the 
context of a subsystem of a real-life application.  
Keywords: AADL, fault tolerance, reuse, patterns 
1. Introduction 
Modeling software architectures has proved to be 
useful for promoting reuse and evolution of large 
applications using extensively components-off-
the-shelf (COTS). In addition, performing several 
analyses of quality attributes such as 
dependability and performance on a common 
architectural model is particularly interesting, as 
this allows making architectural tradeoffs [1].  
The AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language) [2] is a textual and graphical language 
that provides precise execution semantics for 
modeling the architecture of software systems 
and their target platform. It has received an 
increasing interest from the embedded safety-
critical industry (e.g., Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, 
Lockheed Martin, the European Space Agency, 
Astrium, Airbus) during the last years. The AADL 
is characterized by all the properties that an 
architecture description language (ADL) should 
provide (composition, abstraction, reusability, 
configuration, heterogeneity, analysis) [3].  
In this paper, we focus on architecture-based 
dependability modeling and evaluation using the 
AADL. Our work aims at helping engineers using 
the AADL for other purposes (e.g., for 
performance analyses), to integrate dependability 
modeling in their development process.  
We provide guidance on using the AADL 
language for modeling behaviors of fault-tolerant 
software systems, and show that the development 
of patterns is very useful to facilitate the modeling 
of fault tolerance behavior and to enhance the 
reusability of the models. We define a fault 
tolerance pattern as a reusable model describing 
a fault tolerance strategy at the architectural level. 
To be used in a particular system, a pattern must 
be instantiated and customized if necessary. 
The use of patterns and, more generally, 
dependability modeling at architectural level 
favors the reduction of recurrent dependability 
modeling work and the understandability of the 
dependability model (thus reflecting the 
modularity of the architecture) [4] and allows the 
designer to reason about fault tolerance and to 
assign exceptional behavior responsibilities 
among components [5]. At the same time, 
dependability measures (i.e., availability, 
reliability, safety) can be evaluated based on the 
AADL model. This allows predicting the effects of 
particular architectural decisions on the 
dependability of the system [6]. Other analyses 
(e.g., related to performance) may be performed 
on the same AADL model, which allows 
understanding the tradeoff between the benefits 
of a certain fault tolerance pattern and its impact 
on the application’s performance [7].  
From a practical point of view, the AADL model 
must be transformed into a stochastic model such 
as a Markov chain [8] or a Generalized Stochastic 
Petri net [9], to obtain dependability measures 
such as reliability, availability, etc. In this paper 
we focus on the use of patterns to facilitate the 
AADL model construction. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
surveys related work. Section 3 outlines the main 
concepts of the AADL and its support for 
dependability modeling. Section 4 gives guidance, 
resulting from our experience, on building 
dependability models for fault-tolerant software 
systems using the AADL. Section 5 presents 
AADL fault tolerance patterns for three duplex 
software systems (i.e., dual-redundant systems), 
differing by their error detection mechanisms. 
Section 6 illustrates the use of patterns to model a 
real-life application and shows examples of 
dependability analysis results of interest for 
software engineers. Finally, conclusions and 
perspectives are presented in Section 7. 
2. Related work 
Software architecture modeling for dependability 
analysis and evaluation has received a growing 
interest during the last two decades. Early 
approaches have focused on the development of 
analytical models to analyze the sensitivity of the 
application reliability to the software structure and 
the reliabilities of its components (see e.g., [10, 
11] and the survey presented in [12]). More 
recently, the emergence of component-based 
software engineering approaches and architecture 
description languages (ADLs) led to the 
proliferation of research activities on software 
architectures and methodologies allowing the 
analysis and evaluation of performance- and 
dependability-related characteristics. Significant 
efforts have been focused on the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML)1. In particular, a 
number of recent papers consider the 
transformation of UML specifications (enriched 
e.g., with timing constraints and dependability 
related information) into different types of 
analytical models (e.g., Petri nets [13, 14], 
dynamic fault trees [15]) used to obtain 
dependability or performance measures.  
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Besides UML, various ADLs have recently 
received increasing attention from industry and 
academia. A classification of software architecture 
description languages including a critical analysis 
of their modeling capabilities (in particular 
compared to UML) is presented in [16]. Among 
ADLs, the AADL/MetaH2 provides advanced 
support for analyzing quality attributes. It also has 
substantial support for modeling reconfigurable 
architectures. These characteristics led to its 
serious consideration in the embedded safety-
critical industry [17]. 
The AADL allows describing separately the 
analysis-related information that may be plugged 
into the architectural model. This feature 
enhances the reusability and the readability of the 
AADL architectural model that can be used as is 
for several analyses (formal verification [18], 
scheduling and memory requirements [19], 
resource allocation with the Open Source AADL 
Tool Environment (OSATE)3, research of 
deadlocks and un-initialized variables with the 
Ocarina toolset4).  
The reusability of the AADL model is also 
enhanced by the use of a set of fault tolerance 
patterns. The hot standby redundancy pattern 
presented in [7] has been a source of inspiration 
for the three patterns presented in this paper. The 
pattern presented in [7] aims at easing the 
understanding of the functional architecture by 
clearly showing what is replicated and what the 
active system components are. Our patterns 
additionally include a customizable layer of 
dependability-related information (error/failure and 
recovery behavior) and of dynamics necessary for 
evaluating dependability measures. The proposed 
patterns can be used in the context of the iterative 
dependency-driven modeling approach presented 
in [20].  
Our work complements other existing initiatives 
that investigated the development of fault 
tolerance patterns based on object-oriented 
approaches and UML ([21-23]) or other languages 
([24]).  
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3. Overview of the AADL language 
In the AADL, systems are composite components 
modeled as hierarchical collections of interacting 
application components (processes, threads, 
subprograms, data) and a set of compute platform 
components (processors, memory, buses, 
devices). The application components are bound 
to the compute platform. Dynamic aspects of 
system architectures are captured with the AADL 
operational mode concept. Different operational 
modes of a system or system component 
represent different system configurations and 
connection topologies, as well as different sets of 
property values. 
Each AADL system component has two levels of 
description: the component type and the 
component implementation. The component type 
describes how the environment sees that 
component (i.e., its properties and features). 
Examples of features are in and out ports that 
represent directional access points to the 
component. The AADL defines three types of 
ports: event, data, and event data (modeling 
respectively flows of control, data, and control and 
data). One or more component implementations 
can be associated with the same component type, 
matching different component implementation 
structures in terms of subcomponents, 
connections and operational modes.  
An AADL architectural model can be annotated 
with dependability-related information (such as 
faults, failure modes and repair actions, error 
propagation, etc.) through the standardized Error 
Model Annex [25]. AADL error models allow 
modeling complex and realistic components’ 
behaviors in the presence of faults, as shown in 
[26]. Generic error models are defined in libraries 
and are associated with application components, 
compute platform components, as well as the 
connections between them. When a generic error 
model is associated with a component, it can be 
customized if necessary by setting component-
specific values for the arrival rate or the 
probability of occurrence for error events and 
error propagations declared in the error model. 
Error models consist of two parts: the error model 
type and the error model implementation. The 
error model type declares a set of error states, 
error events (inherent to the component) and 
error propagations5. These items can be 
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 Note that error states can model error-free states, 
error events can model repair events and error 
customized when the error model is associated 
with a specific component. Occurrence properties 
specify the arrival rate or the occurrence 
probability of events and propagations. The error 
model implementation declares error 
transitions between states, triggered by 
events and propagations declared in the error 
model type.  
Figure 1 shows an error model of a component 
that may fail and that is restarted to regain its 
error free state. The component cannot be 
influenced by propagations coming from its 
environment, as it does not declare in 
propagations. An out propagation is used to 
indicate notification of dependent components 
when the component fails. 
 
	

error model independent 
features 
  Error_Free: initial error state; 
  Failed: error state; 
  Fail: error event  
 {Occurrence => poisson λ};  
  Restart: error event  
 {Occurrence => poisson µ}; 
  FailedVisible: out error propagation  
 {Occurrence => fixed p}; 
end independent; 


error model implementation 
independent.general 
transitions 
  Error_Free-[Fail]->Failed; 
  Failed-[Restart]->Error_Free; 
  Failed-[out FailedVisible]->Failed; 
end independent.general; 
Figure 1. Two-state error model  
Interactions between the error models of different 
components are determined by interactions 
between components of the architectural model 
through connections and bindings. For example, if 
a component has an outgoing port connection to 
another component, then its out propagation for 
that port gets mapped to the name-matching in 
propagation declared in the error model of the 
receiving component. In some cases, it is 
                                                                               
propagations can model all kinds of notifications. In 
this paper we refer to error states, error 
events, error propagations and error 
transitions without the qualifying term error in 
contexts where the meaning is unambiguous. 
desirable to model how error propagations from 
multiple sources are handled. This is modeled by 
specifying filters and masking conditions for 
propagations, using Guard properties associated 
with features. The interested reader can refer to 
[26] for an extensive list of generic reusable error 
models and Guard properties. 
4. Guidelines for modeling dependability 
In order to analyze the dependability of an 
application at architectural level, it is necessary to 
enrich the architectural model with dependability-
related information relevant to the targeted 
measure(s). Generally, dependability models 
include fault assumptions, stochastic parameters 
for the system, description of recovery and fault 
tolerance mechanisms, and characteristics of 
phases in a phased-mission system. An AADL 
user describes a system’s architecture in the 
AADL and annotates this architectural model with 
error models containing relevant dependability-
related information.  
Section 4.1 discusses the role of AADL 
operational modes and mode transitions. Section 
4.2 discusses the use of operational modes 
versus error states. Section 4.3 presents 
mechanisms for representing the logic connecting 
error states to operational modes. 
4.1. What operational modes are good for 
An operational mode6 is an operational state of an 
AADL component. Exactly one mode is the initial 
mode. A component is in one mode at a time. 
Mode transitions model dynamic operational 
behavior, i.e., switching between configurations of 
subcomponents and connections. Mode-specific 
property values characterize quality attributes for 
each operational mode. A mode transition may be 
triggered by: (1) an out (or in out) event port of 
a subcomponent of the component declaring the 
modes; (2) an in (or in out) event port of the 
component itself; (3) a local event port7. 
A mode transition is triggered by any event that 
arrives through the port named in the mode 
transition. A mode transition may list multiple 
event ports as its trigger condition. In such a case, 
an event through any of the ports triggers the 
transition (an or logic is assumed). For 
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 We will further refer to operational modes simply as modes. 
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 The errata document to the AADL standard provides the 
ability to declare such local ports, representing a call to a 
pre-declared Raise_Event subprogram in a thread.  
dependability analyses, more advanced event-
based mode transition conditions (reflecting e.g. 
voting protocols) can be specified through 
Guard_Event and Guard_Transition properties, 
as presented in Section 4.3. The state machine 
formed by modes and mode transitions in a 
system or system component implementation 
must be deterministic. 
4.2. Operational modes vs. error states 
Modes of operation in phased-mission systems, 
as well as fault-tolerant configurations are 
modeled by AADL modes. 
Operational modes in phased-mission systems 
model configurations representative of different 
phases in a mission. For example, in the case of 
an aircraft model, one may distinguish between 
the takeoff, cruise and landing phases. During 
each phases, the system would have a particular 
configuration with active components and 
connections. Also, different types of faults may 
affect the system in different phases. 
Mode-specific fault-tolerant system configurations 
reflect the fault tolerance strategy chosen for the 
system or for particular parts of the system. For 
example, a fault-tolerant system formed of three 
components may have a nominal operational 
mode corresponding to a triple-redundancy 
configuration and another degraded operational 
mode corresponding to a duplex configuration. 
Usually, phased-mission systems also need 
modes to represent fault tolerance mechanisms. 
In the AADL, this nesting of modes is captured by 
phased-mission modes in a component, which is 
a subcomponent of a system component whose 
modes represent alternative configuration of its 
redundant subcomponents. 
The difference between modes and error states 
lies primarily in their semantics. Error states result 
from occurrences of error events (faults, repair 
events) while modes represent operational states 
of the system that may be totally independent of 
the occurrence of error events.  
4.3. Connecting error states to modes 
The AADL allows us to model logical error states 
separate of the operational mode of the running 
application. It also allows connecting logical error 
states and operational modes by translating 
logical error states into actions (under the form of 
architectural events) on the running system 
through Guard_Event properties. Guard_Event 
properties map error state configurations into 
architectural events that are sent through ports 
and thus may affect the behavior of receiving 
components by triggering mode transitions. An 
architectural event arriving through a port will 
unconditionally trigger a mode transition. 
Sometimes one may need to constrain a mode 
transition in a system component to reflect 
specific conditions such as a voting protocol to 
decide on fault handling. This can be achieved 
through the use of Guard_Transition properties 
associated with mode transitions and specifying 
mode transition logic expressions overriding the 
default or condition on events arriving through 
ports named in the mode transition. 
Guard_Event and Guard_Transition properties 
can be used as advanced decision mechanisms 
that drive reconfiguration strategies.  
5. Fault tolerance patterns 
In this section, we consider a fault-tolerant duplex 
system that uses the hot standby redundancy 
scheme. We present successively, in sections 
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, patterns for three architectural 
implementations of this system. Section 5.4 gives 
concluding remarks.  
Each of the three models contains two identical 
active components, Comp1 and Comp2, modeled 
as threads. Both threads process the event and 
data input stream received by the redundant 
system through the port sysInput but only one 
component’s output is made visible as output of 
the redundant system through the out event data 
port sysOutput. The three patterns differ in terms 
of their error detection mechanisms, as follows.  
The first pattern models the error detection by 
intermediate checkpoints between the two 
components. The direction of the data flow is from 
the primary component to the one that is in 
standby. The redundant system has two 
operational modes, one in which Comp1 is the 
primary and another one in which Comp2 is the 
primary. The component in standby monitors the 
checkpoints sent by the primary and decides to 
take over and change the operational mode of the 
system, if it detects a failure.  
In the second pattern, the error detection is 
achieved by a separate monitoring and control 
component, Controller. The outputs of both active 
components are connected to the output of the 
system, sysOutput, but only one component 
provides the output at a given instant in time. This 
is modeled by two modes associated with each 
active component. Only the component in mode 
primary sends data to the output of the system. 
The Controller initiates the mode transitions.  
The third pattern models error detection by mutual 
observation of outputs. The outputs of both active 
components are connected to the output of the 
system. Each of the two active components 
monitors the output of its sibling and decides 
whether to provide the output or not.  
In the first pattern (detection by intermediate 
checkpoints), modes are represented at the 
system’s level. In the two other patterns, modes 
are represented at the component level. 
Each of the three patterns is formed of an AADL 
architectural model and of error model annex 
subclauses that associate the dependability-
related information to the components of the 
architectural model. These subclauses may be 
further refined during the development cycle to 
detail the internal behavior of components and 
component-specific occurrence of propagations.  
5.1. Detection by intermediate checkpoints 
Figure 2 shows the AADL architectural model for 
this system implementation, using the AADL 
graphical notation.  
 
Figure 2: Detection by checkpoints (graphical) 
The system has two operational modes. In mode 
Comp1Primary, Comp1’s output is made visible 
as output of the system. In mode Comp2Primary, 
Comp2’s output is made visible as output of the 
system. Thus, the connection from Comp1 to the 
out event data port sysOutput of the system is 
active in mode Comp1Primary while the 
connection from Comp2 to the out event data port 
sysOutput of the system is active in mode 
Comp2Primary.  
Based on the input from the other component and 
on its own state, a component in standby can 
decide to take over by initiating a mode transition. 
Thus, the transition from Comp1Primary to 
Comp2Primary is triggered by the out event port 
IAmPrim of Comp2. If both components fail 
successively and if their failures are detectable, 
the first one restarted becomes the primary. 
For this pattern, we show the complete AADL 
architectural model of the system and the error 
model annex subclause associated with its 
components in Figure 3.  
 
thread software 
features 
  Snd: out data port; 
  Receive: in data port; 
  Input: in event data port; 
  Output: out event data port; 
  IAmPrim: out event port; 
end software; 
thread implementation software.generic 
annex Error_Model {** 
 Model => independent.general;  
 Guard_Event =>  
(Receive[FailedVisible] and self[Error_Free]) 
       applies to IAmPrim; 
**}; 
end software.generic; 
system HotStandBy 
features 
  sysInput: in event data port; 
  sysOutput: out event data port; 
end HotStandBy; 
system implementation HotStandBy.checkpoints 
subcomponents 
  Comp1: thread software.generic; 
  Comp2: thread software.generic; 
connections 
  data port Comp1.Snd->Comp2.Receive 
 in modes Comp1Primary; 
  data port Comp2.Snd->Comp1.Receive 
 in modes Comp2Primary; 
  event data port sysInput->Comp1.Input; 
  event data port sysInput->Comp2.Input; 
  event data port Comp1.Output->sysOutput 
 in modes Comp1Primary; 
  event data port Comp2.Output->sysOutput 
 in modes Comp2Primary; 
modes 
  Comp1Primary: initial mode; 
  Comp2Primary: mode; 
  Comp1Primary -[Comp2.IAmPrim]->Comp2Primary; 
  Comp2Primary -[Comp1.IAmPrim]->Comp1Primary; 
end HotStandBy.checkpoints; 
Figure 3. Detection by checkpoints (textual)  
The threads have the same component type and 
implementation, given in the upper part of 
Figure 3. The lower part shows the component 
type and implementation of the system.  
Guard_Event properties specify the mode 
switching conditions. The system must switch 
from Comp1Primary to Comp2Primary when 
Comp2 detects the failure of Comp1 or when both 
components failed and Comp2 was restarted first 
(i.e., Comp2 is Error_Free and Comp1 sends the 
out propagation FailedVisible). 
5.2. Detection by a separate controller  
The system modeled in Figure 4 consists of two 
identical active threads (Comp1 and Comp2) and 
one controller component (Controller).  
Each of the active components can be in one of 
two modes: primary and standby. When a 
component is in primary mode, it provides the 
service expected from the redundant system. The 
Controller monitors the two components. If it 
detects the failure of the one in primary mode, it 
initiates a mode switch in each component, so 
that the one that is Error_Free continues to 
provide the service. Also, if it detects the failure of 
both components, it waits until one of them 
becomes operational and orders it to go to 
primary mode. 
 
Figure 4: Separate controller (graphical) 
Figure 5 shows the textual AADL architectural 
models and error model annex subclauses of the 
component that is initially in primary mode (upper 
part of the figure) and of the controller (lower part 
of the figure).  
thread software 
features 
  InStandby: in event port; 
  BePrim: in event port; 
  Input: in event data port; 
  Output: out event data port; 
  toController: out event port; 
end software; 
thread implementation software.primary 
modes 
  primary: initial mode; 
  standby: mode; 
  primary-[InStandBy]->standby; 
  standby-[BePrim]->primary; 
annex Error_Model {** 
 Model => independent.general;
 Occurrence => fixed 0.9   
  applies to error FailedVisible;
 Occurrence => poisson 1e-3   
    applies to error Fail; 
**}; 
end software.primary; 
system controller 
features 
  fromC1, fromC2: in event port; 
  Prim1, Prim2: out event port; 
end controller; 
system implementation controller.generic 
annex Error_Model {** 
 Model => independent.general; 
 Occurrence => poisson 1e-6  
       applies to error Fail; 
 
 Guard_Event =>    
    fromC1[FailedVisible] and   
    fromC2[Error_Free] and  
    self[Error_Free] 
       applies to Prim2;  
 
 Guard_Event =>    
    fromC2[FailedVisible] and   
    fromC1[Error_Free] and  
    self[Error_Free] 
       applies to Prim1;  
**}; 
end controller.generic; 
Figure 5. Separate controller (textual) 
5.3. Detection by mutual observation 
Figure 6 shows the architectural model of this 
system. Each of the two active components can 
be in one of these three modes: primary, standby 
and reboot. Initially, one component is in primary 
mode while the other one is in standby. When a 
component is in primary mode, it provides the 
service expected from the redundant system. The 
two components observe each other’s outputs. 
Based on these observations and on its own 
state, each component decides whether it must 
be the sender of output. When a failure occurs in 
a component, the component goes to reboot 
mode. If the failed component was in primary 
mode, the other component should take over so 
that the service expected continues to be 
provided. If both components fail one after the 
other, the first one restarted becomes the primary. 
In the two previous patterns, the mode transitions 
of a component or system are controlled by its 
subcomponents or by a separate controller. In this 
pattern, we use self-managing components that 
control their own mode transitions. This is 
modeled by local event ports (represented as 
dotted ovals) triggering the mode transitions. 
 
Figure 6. Mutual observation (graphical)   
The two components’ architectural models are 
identical except for their initial modes, i.e., one is 
initially in primary mode while the other one is in 
standby mode. Thus, Figure 7 shows only the 
textual AADL architectural model of the 
component that is initially in primary mode and its 
associated error model annex subclause.  
In Figure 7, Guard_Event properties are 
associated with all internal ports (expressed by 
self.eventname) named in mode transitions. For 
example, the first declared Guard_Event property 
specifies that the component moves to reboot 
mode when it fails. 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
In sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we assume that all 
components (Comp1, Comp2, Controller) have 
the same behavior in the presence of faults 
(represented by the error model of Figure 1). 
More complex behavior can be considered for 
each component, by customizing the patterns. 
This is achieved by changing the Model property 
in the error model annex subclause associated 
with a particular component. 
Other patterns, modeling different fault tolerance 
schemes and impacting the dependability of the 
system, are presented in [26]. 
 
thread software 
features 
  Input: in event data port; 
  Output: out event data port; 
  fromReplica: in event data port; 
end software; 
thread implementation software.primary 
modes 
  primary: initial mode; 
  standby, reboot: mode; 
  primary-[self.IFailed]->reboot; 
  standby-[self.IFailed]->reboot; 
  reboot-[self.IPrim]->primary; 
  reboot-[self.IStandby]->standby; 
  standby-[self.IPrim]->primary; 
annex Error_Model {** 
 Model => independent.general; 
 Occurrence => fixed 0.9  
      applies to error 
FailedVisible; 
 Guard_Event => self[Failed] 
      applies to self.IFailed; 
 Guard_Event =>    
   
 fromReplica[FailedVisible]   
  and self[Error_Free] 
      applies to self.IPrim; 
 Guard_Event =>    
 fromReplica[Error_Free] and   
  self[Error_Free] 
      applies to self.IStandby; 
**}; 
end software.primary; 
Figure 7. Mutual observation (textual)  
6. Application example 
We illustrate the use of AADL architectural 
patterns for dependability analyses on a safety-
critical subsystem of the French Air Traffic Control 
System. This system has been studied in [27] 
using generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) 
for comparing candidate architecture solutions, 
with respect to availability. The contribution of this 
paper is to show how to model it using the AADL 
fault tolerance patterns.  
The subsystem is formed of two fault-tolerant 
distributed software units that are in charge of 
processing respectively flight plans (FPunit) and 
radar data (RDunit). Two processors can host 
these units. The subsystem must be highly 
available. 
We consider two candidate architectures for this 
subsystem, referred to as Configuration1 and 
Configuration2. Both of them use two processors. 
The two components of each fault-tolerant 
subsystem are bound to separate processors. 
The difference between the two configurations lies 
only in the bindings of RDunit threads to 
processors. In Configuration1, the thread that 
initially delivers the service (Comp1) is bound to 
Processor2 while Comp2 is bound to Processor1. 
In Configuration2, the bindings are the other way 
round (i.e., Comp1 is bound to Processor1 while 
Comp2 is bound to Processor2). The thread that 
delivers the service in the FPunit exchanges data 
with the RDunit. Connections between threads 
bound to separate processors are bound to a bus 
whose failure causes the failure of the RDunit. 
Figure 8 presents both candidate architectures 
using the AADL graphical notation. For the sake 
of clarity, we show the thread binding 
configurations in Figure 8-a and the bus and the 
connection bindings to the bus in Figure 8-b. We 
assume that the error detection is achieved 
through intermediate checkpoints (pattern 5.1).  
The modeling effort is limited. We need to 
instantiate the chosen pattern, to connect together 
the two instances and to bind the threads to 
processors. Besides these rather simple actions, 
we need to associate an error model annex 
subclause with the bus connecting the two 
processors. The error model annex subclauses 
may be further customized, to consider particular 
reconfiguration strategies. 
The AADL models of the two candidate 
architectures presented in Figure 8 are 
transformed into GSPN that are not shown in this 
paper due to space limitations (see [9] for details 
about the transformation process). Figure 9 gives, 
as an example of result obtained from the GSPN 
processing, the unavailability of the two candidate 
architectures. The varying parameter λc is the 
occurrence rate of a bus failure. λc10-6/h 
corresponds to a redundant bus. For 
Configuration1, the impact of this parameter is 
important when λc10-5/h. Configuration2 is much 
less influenced by λc, as in Nominal mode, the 
communication between the two units does not go 
through the bus. From a practical point of view, if 
λc10-5/h, Configuration2 is recommended. 
Otherwise the two candidate architectures are 
equivalent, from the availability viewpoint. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b)
 
Figure 8: Models of Air Traffic Control System candidate architectures 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Unavailability  
7. Conclusion 
Performing several dependability and 
performance-related analyses on a same 
architectural model is particularly interesting for 
software engineers as having qualitative and 
quantitative information about a candidate 
architecture allows making architectural tradeoffs.  
The AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language) is a mature industry-standard well 
suited to address quality attributes. This paper 
illustrated its use for dependability modeling of 
fault-tolerant systems. Model reusability is an 
essential issue in the context of complex safety-
critical evolvable applications. We presented 
patterns for modeling fault-tolerant applications 
and we showed that they enhance the reusability 
and the understandability of the model. Finally, we 
showed a pattern-based example used for 
evaluating the availability of two candidate 
architectures for a subsystem of the French Air 
Traffic Control System.  
Future extensions of this work include the 
construction of a library of AADL architectural 
patterns, and of error models to express common 
dependencies in dependable applications (i.e., 
restoration and reconfiguration strategies). 
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